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  Theories that involve plainly false and even bizarre assumptions are argued to have an 
  important role in bundling empirical facts in a way that allows these to be understood, 
  handled and used as modules in the construction of mechanisms by economists with 
  human cognitive limits. Absurd theories are subcomponents used in a valid 
  explanatory strategy as long as the mechanisms only derive the implications of the 
  facts summarised. This provides a defence and explanation of many economic 
  theories, but also imposes hard limits on such theorising. 





  Are all economists quite mad? The common and long-standing claim that they 
believe in the continuing real-world existence of general equilibrium, flawlessly 
profit-maximising firms and über-rational human logic-machines that calculate the 
optimal amounts of laziness and the welfare maximising paths of heroin consumption 
might suggest so. Anyone agreeing that such assumptions poorly approximate the real 
world faces “perhaps the key methodological problem in contemporary economics” 
(Backhouse (1999:124)): “[H]ow a model, based on assumptions that are typically not 
true, can tell us about the real world” (Backhouse (1999:122)).  
  In what follows we explain why and how clearly absurd theories can tell us 
about the real world, and what role such theories can validly play within economics. 
We do this by giving a new justification for what we call the as-if methodology – the 
(vulgarised?) version of Milton Friedman’s methodological views that sees the 
realism of assumptions as completely irrelevant to how we judge a theory. 
Furthermore, our defence rests on the same kind of facts of human cognitive 
limitations that many critics of economics use to argue against our theories. The short 
version of our claim: Absurd theories in economics can exploit mental models that 
humans naturally use to bundle established facts in untrue mock-explanations. This 
allows us to remember, communicate and exploit the bundled facts and to use them as 
building blocks in sensible theories that deduce the implications of the facts 
summarised by our absurd theories. 
As this summary shows, our defence of absurd theories involves a claim that 
they represent a distinct kind of theory that should be constructed and evaluated in 
very different ways from other theories. For this purpose, we suggest three categories 
of economic theory – As-if theories, mechanisms and pure theory – each discussed in 
a separate chapter. Our claim is that economic theories are quite sensible as long as 
the different kinds of work are not confused with each other.    3
The confusion we wish to remove may be indicated by noting a variety of 
common views: Graduate level textbooks state that utility functions represent binary 
preference relations defined over all choice alternatives, and that they involve no 
assumption concerning altruism, selfishness or other sources of motivation. This 
“formal” and “official” view clashes with practise, where economists discuss whether 
it is “rational” to have a preference for, say, giving to charity or whether this 
presupposes some “warm glow,” etc.
1 Real world data are explained and used to 
“test” economic models of individual decision making even when the models are 
based on seemingly arbitrary collections of possible incentives. Sometimes the data 
will be “average” consumption levels across individuals, with entry-exit decisions 
explained by our model as marginal adjustments by our hypothetical “representative 
agent.” A common defence is that we are only interested in prediction, yet if someone 
attempts a theory without “rationality” or “profit-maximising firms” this is seen as ad-
hoc data fitting rather than a theory experiment to be evaluated with tests of predictive 
power. We need the rationality assumption, it is claimed, as a defence against 
“anything goes” theories that specify tastes and decision rules “ad-hoc.” Yet it is the 
rationality assumption that has been repeatedly argued by critics to be vacuous and 
compatible with any evidence, while “deviations” from rationality and profit-
maximisation are often based on empirical work by psychologists such as Kahneman 
and Tversky and economists such as Herbert Simon. 
  In chapter 1, we note two strategies that have been used to defend economic 
theories – denying absurdity and asserting its irrelevance – and briefly define “as-if 
methodology.” In chapter 2 we present our view of what as-if methodology is and 
should be, and why it is necessary and highly useful. In chapter 3 we discuss research 
on mechanisms, and explain why this kind of work (sometimes labelled deductivism) 
builds on as-if theories more than it provides an alternative to such theories. In 
chapter 4 we briefly discuss pure theory, and in chapter 5 we summarise the 
discussion. 
1  Some previous attempts to defend economic theories 
Two simple strategies for answering the criticism that economic theories are 
absurd are, first, to deny that they are, and second, to deny that it matters. Both these 
                                                 
1 Others who have noted this seeming contradiction are Broome (1999) (Chapter 2) and Sen (1982)    4
strategies have been pursued by economists, and since the as-if defence developed in 
this paper contains elements of both it is useful to briefly consider them. 
A clear and well-written denial of the fact that economic theories are absurd in 
any important sense is Gibbard and Varian (1978). They liken different kinds of 
models to photographs, realistic drawings and caricatures and state that economic 
models ask “What would happen if such and such were the case?” (p. 668). The 
reason we should trust economic models, according to them, is that the assumptions 
of applied theories are approximations, hypothesized by the economist to be “close 
enough to the truth for his purposes” (p.669). Simpler, cruder models are attempts to 
capture tendencies robust to the details of the specification, etc.  
As the response from Dancy (1978) makes amply clear, this defence does not 
convince those who feel that economic theories are mere exercises in mathematics 
used to prop up ideological views:  
Gibbard and Varian’s message has no bearing on that feeling, for those who 
share it are rejecting neo-classical theory not because it employs models, but 
because it employs poor models, and pronouncing them poor not because they 
are only approximations, or highly selective, but because they are not even 
approximations, and not selective but fictional. (Dancy (1978:677)) 
A second response, from philosopher Alexander Rosenberg, sees Gibbard and 
Varian’s account “more like the description of a problem than its solution” 
(Rosenberg (1978:683)), and concludes by asking 
[w]hy it is that economists have continued for so long to use models with false 
assumptions, and indeed with the very same false assumptions, not just for 
decades, but for more than a century, even though they purport to be engaged 
in an attempt to understand the world. (p. 683) 
The “our theories are not absurd” strategy fails because critics feel that our 
theories are so obviously based on false assumptions. To show one example: 
People are assumed to want to get as much for themselves as possible, and are 
assumed to be quite clever in figuring out how best to accomplish this aim. 
Indeed, an economist who spends a year finding a new solution to a nagging 
problem – such as the optimal way to search for a job when unemployed – is   5
quite content to assume that the unemployed have already solved the problem 
and search accordingly. (Richard Thaler, quoted in Buchanan (2002:187)) 
Economics, then, does not need a defence that talks about “good 
approximations” or “capturing the main forces” or “essentials.” We need a defence of 
theories that do not even approximate reality, with plainly wrong assumptions and 
major, known determining factors left out. 
The probably most widely read paper on the method of economics – Milton 
Friedman’s essay on “The Methodology of Positive Economics” – has often been read 
as offering a defence of such absurd theories. His essay and views are more nuanced 
than his simple, readable style might suggest at first glance, a fact revealed by the 
large secondary literature that has quarrelled over how he is to be understood: As 
shown by Stanley (1985), there are at least four different labels that have been slapped 
on Friedman’s essay by various economists and philosophers of science, some of 
them mutually contradictory (for instance falsificationist and verificationist)
2.  
The question of what Friedman really meant might be interesting for historical 
reasons, for shedding light on his own contributions to economic theory, etc., but our 
present concern lies more with the message received than with the message 
transmitted: According to Hausman (1992:164), “Lee Hansen [...] recalls economists 
in the 1950s reacting to Friedman’s essay with a sense of liberation. They could now 
get on with the job of exploring and applying their models without bothering with 
objections to the realism of their assumptions.” A similar understanding of “as-if 
methodology” seems common today. A “slogan” that captures this view of the 
methodology is that realism of assumptions is irrelevant as long as the theory predicts 
well, since the only goal of economic theories is to predict. Several quotes can be 
selected from Friedman’s essay to point in this direction, at times making it seem that 
lack of realism is a virtue: 
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 
“assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, 
and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the 
assumptions (in this sense). [...] To be important [...] a hypothesis must be 
descriptively false in its assumptions [...]. (Friedman (1953:14)) 
                                                 
2 Hirsch and De Marchi (1984), adds two more and are a good entry point into the discussion of 
Friedman’s essay.    6
Whether quotes such as this one give a fair and representative picture of the 
totality of Friedman’s essay is not our concern here, since we are interested in the 
simplified message that was picked up by other economists. A full and nuanced 
understanding of some sub-discipline or theory in economics requires specialisation, 
and since any economist can specialise in only a relatively small number of fields, 
most arguments and results from one subdiscipline will be used mainly in simplified 
and even misunderstood ways by other subdisciplines. This suggests that there is 
limited reason to believe that an in depth study of Friedman’s views in light of his 
own work would help us understand what others of his and later times have 
understood by his essay. For this reason, we use the term “as-if methodology” rather 
than “Friedman’s methodology of positive economics.” This term – as-if – is used 
repeatedly in Friedman’s essay and has been picked up by the profession since. It 
seems, in our experience, often to function as a blanket defence of a model’s 
assumptions: “This is standard as-if methodology,” or “obviously this model is not 
true, it’s just meant to be an as-if model.” 
2  As-if ”theories” 
It is a common human desire to understand something, to explain why 
something is the way it is or how something works. Since the as-if method results in 
theories that – taken “literally” as realist theories making claims about the true nature 
of people and firms – seem clearly untrue, it becomes easy to judge the as-if method 
harshly. “Despite its influence,” as Hausman (1992:163) notes, “Friedman’s essay has 
not been admired by other writers on economic methodology.” Herbert Simon, for 
instance, took time in a footnote to the published text of his Nobel Lecture to state 
that “I cannot in this brief space mention, much less discuss, the numerous logical 
fallacies that can be found in Friedman’s 40-page essay” (Simon (1979:4)), often 
focusing on the “realism” issue in his comments.  
In our view, Simon’s criticism is like criticising a hammer for not being a saw. 
As-if theories are not intended to be true, not even approximately. Their function is to 
take established facts and create a theory/model/story/explanation that implies these 
facts, thus simplifying our knowledge by folding it into a mock-explanation. The 
theory/model/story/explanation can be called a mock-explanation because it is untrue 
and has no intention of being true: Its assumptions may be plainly false, its implied   7
causal mechanisms clearly irrelevant. It may make absurd assumptions concerning 
how people reason, how businesses are organised, how businesses determine prices, 
etc., yet it can still serve a valuable purpose: Bundling facts into building blocks. The 
mock-explanation allows us to remember, grasp, understand and manipulate the 
bundled facts, and it allows us to use these as modules (building blocks) when 
creating higher-level mechanisms built on the facts.     
2.1  The need for mental models 
The philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russel once argued forcefully 
that the notion of causes in itself was unnecessary in science and that systems of 
equations relating different observables were all that we could observe. The word 
“cause” was “so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its 
complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable” (Russel (1913)). 
An analogous claim in economics is that any talk of “unobservables” such as 
rationality, motives/preferences/desires, beliefs/expectations, etc. are “unscientific” 
and that we should restrict ourselves to making theories at the purely formal level 
where our theories relate entirely to observables. Such an argument holds an obvious 
appeal to the positivist in us, since anything beyond what we can observe would seem 
to be “pure speculation” or influenced by unsystematic and unrigorous common sense 
and intuition. The perhaps clearest case in economic theory of trying to follow this 
line of work in practise is Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory (see quotes in 
Sen (1993:496-497). 
One might ask why Samuelson’s and Russel’s projects failed to gain 
dominance. One reason, we would suggest, is that they did not take seriously the 
constraints of human thought: Theories along the above lines would to a large extent 
be consequences deduced from large collections of loose facts. The problem with this 
is that people are unable to hold large collections of arbitrary facts in mind, and when 
they try they immediately start structuring them and creating mental models that 
account for them (Norman (2002:38-39,66-72 )).  
The problem is not just to remember the facts, but also to deduce their 
implications. Humans are inherently good with some kinds of mental models, and a 
problem involving these can be solved easily even when the – formally same – 
problem is hard to solve when formulated in a different way. For instance, one   8
experiment has involved showing people a set of four cards. You are told that the 
cards have letters on one side and numbers on the other. Your job is to choose which 
of the visible cards you need to turn around to test the rule “If a card has D on one 
side, it has a 3 on the other.” The cards shown read (on the visible side)  “D,” “F,” 
“3,” and “7.” The results show that only about five to ten percent were able to do this 
correctly, and that even people who had taken logic courses tended to get it wrong. 
BUT: The exact same problem can be put into a context, given a mock-explanation, 
that enables people to reason validly:  
You are a bouncer in a bar, and are enforcing the rule “If a person is drinking 
beer, he must be eighteen or older.” You may check what people are drinking 
or how old they are. Which do you have to check: a beer drinker, a Coke 
drinker, a twenty-five year old, a sixteen-year-old? (Pinker (1999:336)). 
According to Pinker, it seems that “people get the answer right when the rule 
is a contract, an exchange of benefits. In those circumstances, showing that the rule is 
false is equivalent to finding cheaters.” One hypothesis is that “the mind seems to 
have a cheater-detector,” and that this would make sense from an evolutionary 
perspective. 
A different example concerns our ability to do valid Bayesian inference. Only 
18% (12% in a replication study) were able to find the Bayesian answer to a relatively 
simple problem in medical diagnosis when presented with conditional and 
unconditional probabilities. The same information, in a form designed to correspond 
to how humans process information, increased the proportion who found the Bayesian 
answer to 76% (Gigerenzer (2000:Chapter 6)). 
Our defence of economic theories can now be formulated as a solution to a 
design problem: We have a complex social reality we wish to understand, and (we 
presuppose) there are some stable, observable patterns. Instead of trying to take an 
overwhelming collection of disconnected facts and seeing their consequences, we 
bundle the facts together using mock-explanations that are absurd and patently false 
as-if theories not even loosely approximating reality. Since the bundles exploit the 
kinds of mental models people are inherently good at using, they allow us to combine 
the bundled facts and use them in our thinking and in the construction of higher-level 
theories that build on these facts. A well-designed as-if theory thus exploits precisely   9
those everyday reasoning principles that Russel and Samuelson would remove: 
Causes determining events and motives determining actions.  
2.2  The mental models humans are good at 
The ease with which humans construct and grasp teleological explanations 
when explaining the behaviour of others is well known, e.g. “He painted his house 
because he didn’t want the neighbours to see it as run-down and he thought the house 
was beginning to look shabby.” The theory implicit in such “common-sense,” 
everyday explanations – that humans make choices on the basis of beliefs to satisfy 
their desires – sometimes goes by the name of “folk psychology.” Our predilection for 
such explanations is so strong that many construct them even where they may make 
little sense: Shown a movie of abstract shapes bouncing around on a screen, people 
ascribe motives to the shapes, imagining that the little circle is trying to get away from 
the big triangle which is trying to catch it (Davies (1997:8)). In Aristotelian physics, 
rocks fell because they wanted to return to the earth whence they came. Functionalist 
theories in the social sciences sometimes ascribe sophisticated, intentional action to 
abstract concepts such as “class” or “institution” or “state,” asserting that these 
“desire” or “aim” to achieve ends that neither the individuals who constructed the 
institutions or the individuals who are part of them today are aware of. Finally, 
psychoanalytic theories would postulate obscure and unobservable desires to provide 
teleological explanations for any and all human behaviour. E.g. if you constantly 
ended up in serious accidents, you had a subconscious desire to punish yourself. If 
you messed up your life, you were attempting to punish your parents. And so on. 
What these phenomena show is that humans find it easy to make mental models 
assuming intentionality. Such explanations come easy, and we find them relatively 
simple to understand.  
Similar arguments to the above would hold for causality, where our every-day 
concept seems to relate to experiences of pushing, pulling, striking, squeezing, 
throwing and other such physical manipulations. If we are presented with a story 
where teleological and “everyday causality” are the ingredients, the story will often 
“click” and trigger a feeling of understanding. This feeling carries with it both 
problems and benefits.   10
One problem with this is that we tend to be satisfied once we get the feeling of 
understanding. As argued in Trout (2002), however, the historical record clearly 
shows that this feeling is no trustworthy criterion of truth. 
A second problem is that we have difficulty taking evidence into account in 
the absence of a good “story,” and we have difficulty taking a lack of evidence into 
account in the presence of a good “story.” Dawes (1999) gives examples of this as 
concerns probabilistic reasoning in general, and Dawes (1996) shows how good but 
false stories survive falsification even in science: Despite having been shown to be 
worthless in a number of empirical studies, a large number of psychologists persist 
using Rorschach tests (“What does this ink-blot look like to you?”) and keep on 
believing that a person’s response (“It looks like my father...”) is psychologically 
revealing (p.146-154). Another example concerns the extreme persistence of beliefs in 
“expert psychological judgment,” even when an overwhelming share of studies fail to 
find even weak tendencies in favour of such judgment (p. 75). A further example is 
the article by Milton Friedman (1992) called “Do Old Fallacies Ever Die?” Friedman 
notes the ignorance many show for regression towards the mean even though this 
phenomenon has been known to science for roughly a hundred years. If we are right, 
the problem should be seen as one of design: The explanation involved has yet to be 
phrased in a way that “fits” the thinking of educated economists.  
The above remarks might seem very critical of human abilities, but it is 
important to note that there is an upside as well: Teleological and simple “common 
sense causality” explanations are grasped easily and we “see” what they imply. They 
can therefore be seen as resources that can be exploited, and as-if theories can be seen 
as one way of doing this. For instance: Consider the “selfish gene” formulation of 
darwinian evolution. As its creator Richard Dawkins has written, “[t]he metaphor of 
the intelligent gene reckoning up how best to ensure its own survival [...] is a 
powerful and illuminating one.” At the same time, Dawkins is well aware that it is a 
metaphor, and that – taken at face value – the story is false.  
From 13 years’ experience of teaching it, I know that a main problem with the 
‘selfish-gene survival machine’ way of looking at natural selection is [that some 
are] carried away, and allow hypothetical genes cognitive wisdom and foresight 
in planning their ‘strategy.’ At least three out of twelve misunderstandings of   11
kin selection [...] are directly attributable to this basic error. (Dawkins 
(1999:15)) 
2.3  Exploiting teleological reasoning 
In economics, the teleological principle occurs in (at least) two guises: As 
rationality in consumers, and as profit maximisation in firms. For simplicity, we will 
concentrate on rationality, the case of profit maximisation is quite analogous. 
The first thing to note is that rationality is an empirically empty concept. A 
different term for rationality is “the maximisation assumption” that “[f]or all decision 
makers there is something they maximize”( Boland (1981:1034)). You might 
establish that they do not maximise X, Y or Z, but this proves only that they do not 
maximise X, Y or Z. They might still be maximising something else, e.g. A, B or C. 
Rogeberg (2003) uses the extended utility approach of Gary Becker to argue that 
“even time inconsistencies and what has been called weakened capacity for rational 
choice” can be included in a rational choice theory (p. 307).  
That this point still needed to be made by Boland could be seen as dejecting: 
Hutchison (1938:115) made this point back in the thirties by stating that, to  
render [the “maximum principle”] not obviously false [economists] 
have had to steadily widen it, and thus to diminish its empirical content. [...] 
Fewer and fewer, if any, types of economic conduct remained which were not 
subsumed under it, and almost none were excluded or could falsify it. Its 
empirical content, therefore, simultaneously grew smaller and smaller. To say 
that a piece of economic conduct was “rational” came to mean little, if 
anything, more than that it was a piece of economic conduct. 
The second thing to note is that, from our perspective, this non-falsifiability of 
rationality could be seen as a benefit rather than a problem: Since any behaviour can 
be explained as rational, we can take any observable relationship that remains stable 
in the face of various manipulations of relevance, and summarise the relationship by 
the use of a story. With the story in mind, we can use the established relationships in 
our reasoning, we can communicate them, we can see their implications by using 
them as building blocks in larger theories. The story can well be unrealistic, as long as 
it is consistent with the facts. If well done, it provides a Eureka experience as when a 
number of seemingly unrelated facts that are difficult to understand and recall and use   12
suddenly snap into focus as part of an understandable, intentional pattern. In other 
words: Rationality provides us with a universal fact-summarising machine. It is 
compatible with any facts, and can therefore have universal usefulness in this regard. 
This answers the question asked by, amongst others, Dancy (1978:679) as to why and 
how absurd theories can make true statements about the world.  
2.4  Reinterpreting ”De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum” 
Our suggestion that as-if theories are stories constructed after the fact and 
designed to reproduce and capture as many known empirical facts as possible, may 
not be that far from the intention of past economists: Stigler and Becker (1977), for 
instance, in their famous “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum” paper, note that it is 
easy to throw out seeming anomalies, behaviour or observations that seem 
incompatible with rational choice. “If we could answer these [...] to your satisfaction, 
you would quickly produce a dozen more” (p.76). They state that they interpret their 
Latin title as stating “that tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly 
between people.”  We thus have two viewpoints, one claiming that the analysis stops 
when we find that tastes differ, and the other claiming that tastes do not differ and the 
analysis only stops when we find that this is the case. According to Stigler and 
Becker, the choice between these two  
must ultimately be made on the basis of their comparative analytical 
productivities. On the conventional view of inscrutable, often capricious 
tastes, one drops the discussion as soon as the behavior of tastes becomes 
important – and turns his energies to other problems. On our view one 
searches, often long and frustratingly, for the subtle forms that prices and 
incomes take in explaining differences among men and periods. If the latter 
approach yields more useful results, it is the proper choice. (p.76) 
Note especially the term useful results, which can be interpreted as a statement 
along our lines: It is useful to search out subtle and maybe even bizarre and clearly 
untrue rational choice theories because it is easier to summarise behaviour patterns in 
such terms than it is to describe them in detail and try to use them on that level. If the 
as-if theory also touches on a few explanatory variables that we believe actually are 
important, it becomes even easier to recall and relate to our everyday beliefs about 
what is actually going on, and even easier to exploit using the “intuitive   13
understanding software” that seems to be running in our minds. For this reason, it 
becomes acceptable to selectively provide stories that provide “intuition” for theories, 
even when other, equally strong intuitions go against these same theories. For a theory 
intended to be true, however, this would have been selective, biased evidence.  
This would also explain why many economists find it acceptable to sit in their 
offices and think up the incentives that would explain real human choices, rather than 
beginning with qualitative interviews, psychometric questionnaires or psychological 
research. 
The above view of as-if theory also provides a new perspective on the 
resistance many economists have shown towards the work of researchers such as 
Kahneman-Tversky. The work in cognitive psychology can be (unfairly?) summarised 
as follows: A number of researchers have identified a number of interesting heuristics 
– rules of thumb that humans appear to unconsciously rely on in their everyday 
thinking - and biases reliably triggered in various situations. Let us accept that they 
have found a long list of decision rules and information processing procedures. We 
might then compare two types of theories that bundles the same facts of human 
behaviour. One using the “realistic” heuristics and results from psychology, the other 
using an absurd rational choice theory. The “realistic” one might then be a much more 
complicated theory to understand, communicate and reason with than the rational 
choice explanation, even though the kind of reasoning assumed by the cognitive 
psychologists might well be simpler than the kind assumed by the economist.
3 That 
economists and psychologists should bundle the same facts in different ways is related 
to their differing purposes: The psychologist wants to explain human choices in terms 
of empirically derived sub-components. The economist wants to understand market 
outcomes, interaction effects, etc. and to derive these from human behaviour. The 
economist can therefore be content with a plainly false theory of human behaviour as 
long as it bundles facts in a way suiting his purposes.  
One problem with the theories from cognitive psychology is thus that they fail 
to supply the economist with the mental model of human behaviour that these same 
                                                 
3 Note: More easy to understand and use by economists, not by lay people (who might see the rational 
choice theories as completely inexplicable). As Trout (2002) notes, “What counts as simple or familiar 
is theory-dependent, and not surprisingly, verdicts in particular cases are controversial. [...] A finding 
unfamiliar to the lay public may convey a feeling to the scientist that the pieces of a theoretical puzzle 
have just fallen into place” (p. 214, footnote).   14
theories have noted that humans need. The response of Machina (1999) to the 
Kahneman-Tversky inspired criticisms of rational choice presented in McFadden 
(1999), seem to illustrate this: Rational choice theory is seen as a complete model of 
human behaviour, while Machina sees the psychology-based alternative as a loose list 
of facts tied together mainly by deviating from standard rational choice theory. 
2.5  Economists need not care what makes people tick 
If we are right, the critics and supporters of Rational Choice would both do 
well to remember that economists are not psychologists. Economists are in the 
business of studying the outcome of the behaviour of interacting agents. Their 
demand is for useful representations of individual behaviour  - conceptual robots 
acting consistent with observed behaviour of real people, not accurate representations 
of unique individuals. For such purposes, then, rational choice theory might well seem 
to be the best option available. 
Keeping this in mind also helps us make sense of other puzzling things in the 
economics literature. As for instance why the most mainstream use of finds from 
cognitive theory is to embed them in an absurd rational choice model to provide new 
rational choice stories. For instance, Laibson (2001) is an interesting and well-written 
paper that relies on psychological research to create an absurd theory that can be 
summarised as follows: There is a large amount of psychological evidence that rats 
and people easily become physiologically conditioned to crave drugs in the presence 
of environmental cues. In other words: If you always smoke a cigarette after clearing 
your desk, clearing the desk will make you crave cigarettes. Laibson shows that this 
can generate interesting behaviour patterns in a rational toy person who is fully aware 
of these effects, lives in some weirdly unreal world where there are only two cues – 
which follow a known probability distribution such that one but only one is present at 
any time – and where the individual designs the choice-plan that maximises the 
expected sum of a mathematical function characterising all he cares about in 
arithmetic quantities. The psychological evidence he presents, on the other hand, 
consists of people and animals becoming conditioned without being aware of it to any 
of a huge number of easily manipulable environmental cues, and behaving in other 
respects in direct contradiction to his model (his model asserts that drug users should 
want to avoid other drug users, since they present cues with a negative direct effect on 
utility). In other words: The theory is plainly false if understood as a theory of why   15
humans do what they do, but Laibson feels that it is able to bundle certain facts not 
easily bundled into other rational addiction theories.  
Using terminology from a recent article from outside of economics by Leplin 
(1986), we can phrase our point differently: Economists are not methodological 
realists when it comes to their as-if theories – this kind of work is not guided by a 
belief that unobservable entities such as preferences and beliefs and choice rule refer 
to something in the real world.  
I claim that at the level of methodology, if not epistemology, a distinction 
must be drawn among theoretical entities between those treated realistically 
and those proposed as mere possibilities to be exploited for their heuristic and 
explanatory potential. This means, once again, that questions about the 
existence and properties of entities of the former sort are regarded as 
substantive questions which continuing research is directed at answering; our 
interest in the latter is directed at the empirical adequacy and heuristic utility 
of theories in which they appear. (p.49) 
One piece of supporting evidence from this claim is the experience of 
economist (or psychoeconomist) Alan Nelson, whose research program, according to 
Rosenberg, takes the study of choices seriously by actually specifying and trying to 
operationalise such variables as beliefs and desires.  
Nelson asks why traditional economists find the research program of 
psychoeconomics wholly without interest. [...] Given the evident possibility of 
the line of inquiry Nelson calls psychoeconomics, it is puzzling to him that the 
ruling orthodoxy in economics rules out any contribution from psychology. He 
wonders what it is about this line of inquiry that economists find so repellent. 
(Rosenberg (1992:134) 
Our answer to this question is that economists realise– at some level – that this 
is misguided, that this is not what they want to do, that this is not the point of their as-
if theories. While Rosenberg (1992) is fully aware of the possibility and coherence of 
positions such as ours, he believes such an answer “incurs considerable costs, costs so 
great that few economists are willing to pay them” (p. 160). The reason is that such 
theories no longer provide explanations, and that they become useless for welfare 
analysis. We agree with this, but would argue that the choice is simple: False but   16
empirically relevant “theories” useful as a building block in further theories on the 
one hand, and absurd, poorly justified and unfalsifiable theories of formalised folk 
psychology taken to extremes on the other.  
By deciding to fully step over to our position, economists would also avoid the 
common retreat they sometimes end up making to the “official” textbook versions of 
utility functions when someone presses them. “We take choice-patterns as given,” the 
economists respond, “we just represent whatever observable patterns there are using 
our formal framework.” Yet, in practise, they soon go back to discussing issues such 
as whether it can be “rational” to vote since no single individual has any influence 
except in rare cases. If our view of as-if theory is accepted, this kind of retreat to 
sterile formalism followed by slinking back into folk psychology and rational choice 
could be seen as the result of economists not having had any clear, good justification 
for common practises. They have not been able to take a stand and say that ridiculous 
as-if theories are perfectly sensible given their aims. They have not been able to give 
up the silly hope that they can achieve true knowledge about the inner workings and 
welfare of their fellow humans by setting up a system of equations supported by 
loose, motivating stories and solving for max of U. Hopefully, this may now change.  
To summarise: It is possible to exploit our knowledge of human cognition to 
bundle observable, stable patterns (the existence of which it seems hard to doubt with 
any strong degree of faith) inside mock-explanations – absurd theories that “explain” 
these as sensible, purposeful behaviour – thus enabling us to summarise, 
communicate and reason with the facts. 
2.6  Remembering that as-if theories are not really theories  
While our defence of absurd theories defends much of what economists do, it 
does not imply that anything goes: One important fact that follows from the above is 
that we need to remember and take seriously the fact that our rational choice models 
are tools, summarising fictions, toy models or, quite simply, just another way of 
stating what we see. Any part of the story not related directly to the observable 
relationships must be remembered for being just this. We are confused if we start 
believing that we have shown in any realist sense that it is true that people actually 
are rational in the sense described by our as-if theory when we observe that real 
people act in the way our toy models “predict.” We have created a memorable fiction   17
to summarise empirical relationships, and if competently done this fiction will of 
course summarise empirical relationships since it is nothing but a summary of 
empirical relationships. 
The problem is that there are no clear reminders of this fact, no 
methodological principles to stop economists from taking the rational choice theories 
literally. Since as-if theories exploit folk psychology and surround their mathematical 
formulation with stories that provide “intuition” and feelings of “insight” and 
“understanding” that tend to give people a mistaken and misguided faith in the truth 
of these theories, this is a very real danger. The result is misunderstandings both 
within and outside the profession. 
An interesting (and quite innocent) example is Schoemaker (1982), who (in 
the context of Expected Utility (EU) theory - discusses ideas quite similar to our 
version of “as-if” methodology under the title postdictive theory, where the 
essential premise of the postdictive EU view is that all observed human 
behavior is optimal (in the EU sense), provided it is modeled in the 
appropriate manner. Seeming suboptimalities are explained, ex post facto, by 
introducing new considerations (e.g. costs, dimensions, constraints, etc.) that 
account for the anomalies so as to make them optimal. (p. 539) 
Schoemaker even notes that an advantages of optimality principles is that they 
allow a “parsimonius summary of empirical knowledge” (p. 540), yet he differs from 
us in stating that “A major limitation of the postdictive view is that ex post empirical 
models may have limited refutation power regarding the corresponding theoretical ex 
ante model” (p. 540). In other words, he sees what we would call as-if theories as 
attempts to find true theories, and thus sees it as a problem when economists do not 
try to falsify their theories but instead go on a verificationist search for confirming 
evidence. From our perspective, as-if theories should be “tested” in a verificationist 
manner, since this involves searching for and identifying as many empirical facts as 
we can possibly find to summarise with one and the same as-if theory. 
From our perspective, too, it is not at all puzzling why plainly false 
assumptions allow us to make true statements about the world: The plainly false 
assumptions have been carefully chosen to yield the conclusions that we knew – 
before constructing the theory – were true.    18
3  Mechanisms 
As-if theories do not exhaust the set of all economic theories, and economics 
would be a poor science if it did. A second type of theories aims to uncover and 
describe causal mechanisms. In this case, it is the true explanation underlying a 
phenomenon we are interested in, and this explanation will often consist of deductions 
from assumptions that are well-established approximations. Philosopher Daniel 
Hausman has labelled such bottom-up theorising deductivism, and argues that it is a 
valid and useful method of analysis for a social science given the complexity of social 
phenomena. Whereas Hausman (1989) seems to view this kind of theory as 
incompatible with the instrumentalist or “predictionistic” as-if method, we want to 
argue that the two are complementary. In this, we build on Woodward (2002), whose 
abstract neatly summarises the main point: 
Mechanisms consist of parts, the behavior of which conforms to 
generalizations that are invariant under interventions, and which are modular 
in the sense that it is possible in principle to change the behavior of one part 
independently of the others. 
Using this view of explanations from mechanisms we can sketch out a 
“hierarchy” of empirical work, starting with the establishment of empirical facts (E.g. 
when the price of a good increases, consumers buy less of it). As-if theories bundle 
such empirical facts together into a mock-explanation, and the as-if theories (rational 
consumers, profit maximising firms, etc.) are used as building blocks – modules – in 
theories that relate these to each other in such a way that they can reproduce the 
phenomenon we wish to explain. In Woodward’s words 
My suggestion is that at least part of what it means to say that we have 
identified the mechanism responsible [for a phenomenon] and that we have 
correctly segregated that mechanism into components is that we have 
exhibited [the phenomenon explained] as the consequence of components that 
are independently changeable in the way just described. (p.S375) 
In our words: We can only explain Y in terms of something else, e.g. X, Z, ... 
These explanatory factors must then be taken as given. Since our mechanism should 
explain something in the world, the building blocks need to refer to the world and to 
capture something we have reason to believe in, either because it is “a priori” true (if   19
such a thing exists) or because it is well supported by evidence. They have to be 
stable, in the sense that they represent something we know and believe will also be the 
case in the future (at least within certain limits). When the summarised facts refer to 
the responses of firms and people, we will often find that a simple way of 
summarising them is to summarise them in the form of a rational choice or profit 
maximisation story. We then have observable facts bundled into absurd theories used 
as building blocks of a mechanism intended to capture an actual process operating in 
society. Such a strategy is OK as long as we do not start deriving the implications of 
the non-factual parts of our as-if models.  In other words: We must be careful not top 
treat our armchair assumptions of preferences, expectations, choice rule, information, 
etc. as true of real world individuals.  
It is necessary to emphasise this point repeatedly, since it is violated quite 
often in practise. At the same time, it is simple enough that it seems difficult to deny: 
A very basic empiricist view is that we need some form of empirical evidence to 
support claims about the real world. As-if theories are created by seeing what real 
people do and then tinkering with the preferences, information, beliefs, etc. of a 
flexible model until our constructed rational individual “acts like” a real person in 
some regard. Unless we have evidence that people are rational, and do possess the ad-
hoc assumed preferences, information, etc., then there is no reason to trust the 
implications of these assumptions. This should be especially clear if we recall that 
rationality is empirically empty, so that we would have been able to make a rational 
choice theory for any conceivable behaviour. To use a simple reductio ad absurdum: 
“My rational toy person, constructed ad-hoc by me in my office based on rough 
generalisations and bizarre claims about human motivation and reasoning, would 
receive a higher utility if allowed to maim himself with knives. Ergo, I should not be 
disturbed by the suicidal behaviour of my son.” 
Note also that the above discussion of mechanisms could support a wide 
variety of mechanism-theories: Some economists might create mechanisms in verbal 
theories because their assumptions would be poorly captured by formal models, others 
might create formal models in order to clarify their mechanism, check their reasoning 
and get their point across – using simple and clearly wrong assumptions intended to 
be qualitatively representative – and yet others might believe that there are stable, 
quantitatively specifiable relationships that can be empirically estimated using   20
structural modelling or calibration techniques, to be used as components in larger 
models intended for precise predictions.   
4  Pure theory 
  Our explanation of as-if theory relies on there being something known about 
how humans and firms behave that we can summarise. This leaves open the question 
of how “pure” theory with no known empirical applications, such as General 
Equilibrium theory or complex game theoretical solution concepts, should be 
understood. We have no single answer to this question, only some brief suggestions: 
Some might be seen as stocking up the profession with further as-if tales to be 
used for summarising as-yet-not-identified empirical facts. 
Some might be attempts to summarise facts that are believed by the economist 
involved to exist, but not yet documented in a manner that persuades others. 
Some might be confused attempts to correctly specify the rational choice 
problem faced by real people in some context and derive the “true” explanation, the 
“normatively” correct thing people “should” do, or the actual “welfare effects” of 
policies. One might, of course, believe that people act in their best interest, or that 
they tend to do so, that they learn to do so over time, that most of them do so, that 
they usually do so, that they do so except in certain identified contexts, etc. Or one 
might believe that we have no feasible alternative preferable to consumer sovereignty. 
There might be valid arguments and evidence to support such beliefs, our point here is 
completely neutral towards alternative views on the issue. We restrict ourselves to 
noting that none of these claims can be either established or falsified by ad-hoc 
theoretical models fitted to empirical observations in a flexible framework that could 
generate any conceivable behaviour.  
Other such theories might be a form of mathematical fiction, enjoyed by some 
but not all economists, presenting stories of conceptual people in strange hypothetical 
worlds who act – in certain aspects – similarly to real people. Some economists might 
find such work aesthetically pleasing and preferable to reality with its poor data, 
inference problems, etc.    21
Though no exhaustive taxonomy of possible views of pure theory, the above 
suggestions show that such work may be seen as valuable even though it has no 
apparent connection to reality.  
5  Summary and conclusion 
It is tempting to see the above as an as-if theory of as-if theory, where as-if 
theory is explained as the rational response to cognitive limitations in humans, a way 
to bundle facts and hypotheses in a form that exploits folk psychology. In addition, 
our “theory” of as-if theory seems useful, in that it makes many common practises in 
economics seem meaningful and sensible, reminds us of obvious limits such 
theorising has, and clarifies when economics becomes truly absurd and how to avoid 
it (e.g. when it starts taking welfare-analysis based on as-if theories seriously). 
Ideally, there should be something in the name of our theoretical representations of 
individuals and firms that reminded us that these as-if theoretical constructs were not 
meant to be taken literally, e.g. utility-robots, proxy-people, math-men. Since 
economic terminology is well-established, it seems futile to try and change it. 
Hopefully, providing a story to help us remember it may be a good second-best. To 
summarise our article as a slogan: A good as-if theory is no theory at all, just a 
shorthand summary of facts. We assume that consumers are rational, self-interested 
super-computers because we take seriously the fact that we ourselves are not. 
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